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1. Introduction 
 
Stochastic models for solving some problems were used among others by 
Ermakov (see [8,9]) and Văduva (see [18,20]).  
For solving the linear system 
 
fxAx +⋅=  (1) 
 
Ermakov uses an ergodic Markov chain with n states, where n is the 
dimension of the system. The transition probabilities of this Markov chain are 0 
for the null elements of A and non-zero values in the contrary case. We consider 
an arbitrary vector h and an initial distribution ( ) niip ,1=  with non-zero values at 
the same positions. Using a trajectory of this ergodic Markov chain Ermakov 
estimates the scalar product xh, , where x  is the solution of the system. 
Văduva (see [18,20]) uses, opposite Ermakov, an absorbing Markov 
chain with 1+n  states instead of an ergodic Markov chain with n states. The 
values Pij for  nji ≤≤ ,1  are built in the same way as in Ermakov, but the sums 
of the transition probabilities from the state ni ,1=  to the states from 1 to n 
become less then 1. The differences to 1 are the probabilities to move to the 
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state n + 1 (absorption). Using N independent trajectories Nγγ ,...,1  with the 
initial transient state i0, Văduva estimates 
0i
x . 
In fact between the ergodic Markov chains and the absorbing Markov 
chains there exists a connection (see [13]). 
In [5] we use a Jackson queueing network (see [10]) to solve some linear 
systems of equations. A Jackson queueing network is an open network with k 
nodes such that the inter-arrival time in the node i from outside the network 
is ( )iλexp , the service time at the node i is ( )iµexp  and after he finishes its 
service at the node i, a customer goes to the node j with the probability Pij or 
lives the network with the probability Pi0. The arrivals from outside network are 
set according to the right sides, and the transition probabilities Pij are set 
according to the system matrix A (see [5]). If the right sides have elements with 
different signs we have to generate two Jackson queueing networks: one for 
positive values and one for the negative ones. Using the average numbers of 
customers in the nodes we can find the solution of the system. 
In [6] we have solved by the Monte Carlo method the nonlinear equation in σ   
 ( )( ) ,1 σσµ =−∗A  (2) 
 
where A* is the moments generating function of the inter-arrival times density 
function a  (i.e. its Laplace transform): 
 
( ) ( )dttaeA t ⋅= ⋅−∞∗ ∫ ξξ
0
. (2’) 
 
We generate (see [6]) a G/M/1 queueing system with the inter-arrival 
times density function a and the service times ( )µexp . We divide the simulation 
period t into m periods when we have no arrival and no service finalization. We 
estimate the average number of customers in the system and, using this 
estimation we estimate a solution of the nonlinear equation if we know an 
analytical formula for A*. In the contrary case, we can solve an integral equation 
in the same way (see [6]). 
A Gordon and Newell queueing network (see [11]) is a closed queueing 
network with k nodes and N customers. The service time in the node i has the 
distribution  ( )iµexp , and after the service in this node the customer goes to the 
node j with the probability Pij. We notice that the matrix P as above is the 
transition matrix of an ergodic Markov chain (see [13]). If we denote by ( ) kiip ,1=  the ergodic probability we know that 
 
SOLVING NONLINEAR SYSTEMS OF EQUATIONS AND NONLINEAR SYSTEMS... 113 
( ) jnjk
j
kk xnNnNP ∏
=
⋅===
1
11 ,..., α ,  (3) 
 
where xj is proportional with 
j
jp
µ , and α is computed such that 
 
( ) 1,...,11
1
===∑
∑ =
=
kk
Nn
nNnNP
j
k
j
.  (3’) 
 
A Buzen queueing network (see [3]) is a generalization of a Gordon and 
Newell queueing network where the service in the node i depends on the 
number ni of customers in that node: its distribution is ( )( )iii na µ⋅exp , where 
0>iµ  and ai is a given function. In this case we have 
 
( ) ( )jj
n
j
k
j
kk nA
x
nNnNP
j∏
=
⋅===
1
11 ,..., α ,  where (4) 
 
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≠∏
=
=
=
0,
0,1
1
jj
n
i
j
jj nifia
nif
nA j  (4’) 
 
and α is given by (3’). 
We will solve some nonlinear systems of equations by the Monte Carlo 
method using closed queueing networks and some results from games theory 
that we will present in the following. 
 
Definition 1 
A game is in the normal form if ( )iiDI π,,=Γ , where I is the set of the 
players, Di is the set of pure strategies of the player i, and R→×= i
n
i
i D
1
:π  is a 
function with ( )diπ  being the utility of the player i if the player j uses the 
strategy dj and  ( ),...,...,1 iddd = . 
 
 
Definition 2 
The game is finite if I={1, 2, …, n} is finite. The game is with complete 
information if  Di are finites. 
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Definition 3 
A mixed strategy of the player i is a probability distribution xi on Di. 
We denote by ∆i the set of mixed strategies of the player i and by 
ii
n ∆×=Θ =1 . We denote also by ( )ii dx  the probability that the player i uses the 
pure strategy di. Because in the case of non-cooperative games the mixed 
strategies xj are independent, we obtain the following formula for the average 
utility of the player i: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ddxx,...,xuxu ijjn
1jd
n1ii π⋅== ∏∑
=Θ∈
. (5) 
 
Definition 4 ( ) Θ∈= −ii xxx ,  is a Nash equilibrium if for any iiy ∆∈  we have  ( ) ( )iiii xyuxu −≥ , . 
 
Theorem 1([22,16,17]) 
For any finite game with complete information the set NEΘ  of Nash 
equilibria is not empty. 
 
Definition 5 
A two-player game with complete information is called bimatriceal. 
In this case { } { } ( ) ijAjinDmD === ,,,...,1,,...,1 121 π  and ( ) ij2 Bj,i =π . 
 
Definition 6 
The game is symmetric if m = n and AT = B. The game is doubly symmetric 
if AT = B. 
In a symmetric game ∆=∆=∆ 21 . We denote by ( ){ }NENE xxx Θ∈∆∈=∆ , . 
 
Theorem 2([22]) 
For any symmetric two-player game NE∆  is not empty. 
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2. Solving Nonlinear Systems of Equations 
 
Consider the symmetric two-persons game given by the kk ×  matrix A. 
We denote by e(i) the vector with k components ( ) ijije δ= . We denote by ∆0 the 
set of the solutions from ∆ of the nonlinear system 
 
( )( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=∑
==⋅−
=
1
,1,0
1
i
k
i
i
Ti
x
kixAxxe
 (6) 
 
and by ( )∆∩∆=∆ Int000 . 
 
Theorem 3([22]) 
In the above conditions we have ( )∆∩∆=∆ IntNE00 . 
Consider now the function kR→D:g , where D is a domain such that  
kD R⊂⊂∆ . We will use the same notations as above for the system 
 
( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=∑
==⋅
=
1
,1,0
1
i
k
i
ii
x
kixxg
 (6’) 
 
Definition 7([22]) 
The function g from (6’) is a regular growth-rate function if it is Lipschitz 
continuous on D and ( ) 0=⋅ xxg T  for any ∆∈x . 
 
Definition 8([22]) 
Let g be a regular growth-rate function. g is payoff monotonic if for any  
∆∈x  and { }kji ,...,1, ∈  we have ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )xgxgxeuxeu jiji >⇔> ,, . g is payoff 
positive if for any ∆∈x  and { }ki ,...,1∈  we have ( )( ) ( )( )( )xxeuxg ii ,sgnsgn −= . 
 
Definition 9([22]) 
A regular growth-rate function is weakly payoff positive if for any  ∆∈x  
we have  ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ } ( ) 0,, >⇒Φ≠>= xgxxuxeuixB ii   for at least one ( )xBi∈ . 
We know (see [22]) that if a regular growth-rate function g is payoff 
positive or payoff monotonic then g is weakly payoff positive. If g from (6’) is a 
regular growth-rate function we know that i
k
i
x
1=
∑  is constant. 
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Theorem 4([22]) 
If g is a weakly payoff positive growth-rate function and ( )∆∈ Intx  x is a 
solution of (6’)  if and only if NEx ∆∈ . 
Therefore solving the nonlinear system of equations (6’) in the case that 
we know the matrix A such that g is a weakly payoff positive growth-rate 
function is equivalent with finding the interior Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose that at a given moment the distribution of the pure strategies in 
the population is given by x. A player who uses the pure strategy i at that 
moment decide to revise his strategy with the average rate ( )xri . At the revision 
moment the player continues with the strategy i with the probability ( )xpii , or 
he changes his strategy with ij ≠  with the probability ( )xp ji . 
For some particular cases of ri and jip  Lipschitz-continuous on an open 
domain X that contains ∆ and any ∆∈ Intx 0 , if the time moments tends to 
infinity x tends to an interior Nash equilibrium (see [22]). 
The first model considered by Weibull is the imitation driven by 
dissatisfaction. In this case we have 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
=
=
xxeuxr
xxp
i
i
j
j
i
,,ρ , (7) 
 
where ρ is a Lipschitz-continuous function, strictly decreasing in its first 
argument. Particularly, if ( ) aba ⋅−= βαρ , , where β>0 and ( )( )xeu i ,⋅≥ βα  
we obtain 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
⋅−=
=
Axexr
xxp
Ti
i
j
j
i
βα .  (7’) 
 
For instance we can take in (7’) β = 1 and ijji A,max≥α , and the above 
conditions are fulfilled. In the C++ program we consider ijji A,max>α  to avoid 
the average rate 0  (i.e. with ∞=µ ). 
Another model is the imitation of the successful agent, model I (see [22]). 
We have 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
>−−Φ⋅=
=
0,,
1
xeeuifxeeuxxp
xr
ijij
j
j
i
i  ,  (8) 
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where Φ  is a probability distribution on the strategies that involve a greater 
payoff strictly increasing on the payoffs' difference ( ) ( )( )xeeu ij ,− . A simple 
modality to compute the above probabilities is to divide the positive differences 
of payoffs by their sum. Because ( ) ( )( )( )xeeu ij ,−Φ  is multiply by xj the sum of 
the above probabilities  ( )xp ji  is less than 1. The rest to 1 is uniform distributed 
to all the strategies (including i) such that ( ) ( )( ) 0, =− xeeu ij . 
Another model is the imitation of the successful agent, model II (see [22]). 
We have 
 ( )
( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
=
⋅∑
⋅
= h
h
i
k
h
j
j
i
xxxeu
xxxeuj
i
i
xp
xr
,,
,,
1
1
ω
ω ,    (9) 
 
where ( ) 0, >⋅⋅iω  is Lipschitz-continuous in the first argument. If we take 0>µ  
and  ( )( )xeu i ,⋅−> µλ  for any i we can consider the above function iω  linear: ( ) zxzi ⋅+= µλω , . If the payoffs are positives (we can make them positives by 
adding a positive constant to each element of the matrix A) we can take λ = 0 
and we obtain 
 ( )
( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
=
=
Axx
Axej
i
i
T
Tj
xp
xr 1
.  (9’) 
 
We solve the nonlinear system of equations (6’) by generating a closed 
queueing network with k nodes and N customers as follows. 
1) We consider at each moment N
N
i
ix = , where Ni is the number of 
customers in the node i. 
2) After the end of a service at the node i the customer goes to the node j 
with the probability ( )xpP jiij =  from the above models. 
3) We generate the next service in the node i having the distribution ( )( )xriexp . 
The above queueing network is generated as a Gordon and Newell 
queueing network or a Buzen queueing network during a maximum simulation 
period tsim, but after any service in the node i we have to refresh the values of 
Pij and µi. Pij are computed just before the customer lives the node i, and µi is 
computed just after these. For starting from an interior x we take initially Ni = N1 
and 1NkN ⋅=  and we generate the first service in each node. 
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Example 1 
Consider the system of equations (6) with 
 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
−−
−
−−
=
5.27011
10114
123125.3
09241
15.2315
A . 
 
First we generate the exponentials by the inverse method. We obtain 
 
( )Tx 185.0,203.0,209.0,192.0,211.0=  
 
and  ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00478.0,00116.0,02489.0,02467.0,00339.0 −−−=⋅−  (these values 
are theoretically equal to 0) if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )Tx 081.0,112.0,12.0,189.0,498.0=  
 
and  ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00445.0,00209.0,03636.0,00386.0,03487.0 −−=⋅−   if we 
consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )Tx 192.0,192.0,217.0,201.0,198.0=  
 
and  ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00383.0,00122.0,02272.0,02477.0,00466.0 −−−=⋅−   if we 
consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II . 
Next we generate the exponentials by the rejection method. We obtain 
 
( )Tx 208.0,203.0,196.0,19.0,203.0=  
 
and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00396.0,00157.0,02319.0,0246.0,0038.0 −−−=⋅−   if we 
consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )Tx 092.0,112.0,163.0,183.0,45.0=  
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and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00259.0,00451.0,03898.0,00723.0,02983.0 −−=⋅−   if we 
consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )Tx 155.0,27.0,185.0,183.0,207.0=  
 
and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00928.0,00834.0,02985.0,0312.0,00229.0 −−−=⋅− if we 
consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. 
Finally we generate the exponentials by the mixture method. We obtain 
 
( )Tx 194.0,202.0,204.0,202.0,198.0=  
 
and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00417.0,00254.0,02353.0,0263.0,00441.0 −−−=⋅−  if we 
consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )Tx 092.0,12.0,133.0,173.0,482.0=  
 
and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00399.0,00337.0,03779.0,005.0,03341.0 −−=⋅−  if we 
consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )Tx 205.0,171.0,201.0,203.0,22.0=  
 
and ( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00126.0,00063.0,02195.0,02279.0,00272.0 −−=⋅−  if 
we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. 
 
 
3. Solving Nonlinear Systems of Differential Equations 
 
First we denote for any vector ( )Tkyyy ,...,1=  by ( ) ( )Tyy keey ,...,exp 1= . 
Consider the  kk ×  matrices B and BA ⋅=α , and the Cauchy problem 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
⋅⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
0
0
~~
'~exp
~exp'~
ii
i
i
yy
yByey
τ
τϕατ , (10) 
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where φ is a monotonic function on the interval bordered by τ0 and τ1 with 
( ) 00 =τϕ  and  ( ) ( )01
1
lim τττϕττ ≠∞=→ , and ( )( )∑==
k
i
iy
1
0~expα . If we take ( )yy ~exp=  
and ( ) ( )( )00 ~exp yy =  we obtain the equivalent Cauchy problem 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
′⋅⋅⋅⋅−=′
0
0 ii
i
Tyi
i
yy
yyBey
τ
τϕτ α . (11) 
 
Consider a weak positive payoff growth-rate function g if A is the payoff matrix 
of a symmetric two players game. Consider also the systems of differential equations 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
0
0
~
'
~exp'~
ii
ii
yy
ygy
τ
τϕατ , respectively (10’) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
=
′⋅⋅=′
0
0 ii
i
y
ii
yy
ygy
τ
τϕτ α . (11’) 
 
If we use in (11) and (11’) the substitutions α
yz =  and ( ) ( )α00 yz = , we 
obtain the systems of differential equations 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
′⋅⋅−=′
0
0 zz
zAzzez
i
i
Ti
i
τ
τϕτ   and (12) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
=
′⋅⋅=′
0
0 zz
zzgz
i
iii
τ
τϕτ
, (12’) 
 
where ( ) 10
1
=∑
= i
k
i
z . 
Finally we use the substitutions ( ) ( )( )tztx 1−= ϕo  and ( ) ( )00 zx = . We 
obtain the systems of differential equations 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
⋅−=′
00 xx
xAxxetx
i
i
Ti
i   and  (13) 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
=
⋅=′
00 xx
xxgtx
i
iii . (13’) 
 
We know that for ∞→t  in (13) or (13’) x tends to an interior Nash 
equilibrium x* if ( )0x  is interior (see [22]). 
Therefore we obtain x* as in the previous section, and ( ) ∗= xz 1τ . 
Obviously ( ) ( )( )11 ~exp τατ yxy =⋅= ∗ . In the algorithm we do not need to 
multiply B by α because if we apply a linear increasing function to the payoffs 
we obtain an equivalent game. We notice that the results do not depend on φ, τ0 
and τ1. The only conditions are that φ is a monotonic function on the interval 
bordered by τ0 and τ1 with ( ) 00 =τϕ  and ( ) ( )01
1
lim τττϕττ ≠∞=→ . From a given φ 
monotonic on an interval we can find ( )010 −= ϕτ  and ( )∞= −11 ϕτ . If we have 
only φ’ we need the value of τ0. 
 
Example 2 
Consider the system of differential equations 
 
( ) τατ −⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= ∑∑∑
= =
+
= 6
11'~
5
1
5
1
~~5
1
~
j k
yy
jk
j
y
iji
kjj eBeBy  
 
with  
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
−−
−
−−
=
5.27011
10114
123125.3
09241
15.2315
B  
 
and the initial condition ( ) ( ) ( )Tyy 3,1,0,1,11~~ 0 −== . 
We obtain ( )( ) 60826.29~exp5
1
0 ==∑
=i
iyα . Because the primitive of τ−61  is  
( ) C+−− τ6ln  we obtain 6,5ln 1 == τC  and ( ) ττϕ −= 65ln . 
First we generate the exponentials by the inverse method. We obtain 
 
( ) ( )Ty 7935.1,82263.1,7533.1,7533.1,76857.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
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( ) ( )Ty 93465.0,08547.1,34783.1,70604.1,6909.26~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( ) ( )Ty 74816.1,75841.1,71674.1,4159.1,82263.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. For the computation 
of the theoretical solution we make the substitutions to obtain the system (13) 
and, from the above considerations we take BA =  instead of BA ⋅=α . We obtain 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00444.0,00282.0,02356.0,02611.0,00417.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00476.0,00293.0,03743.0,00297.0,03623.0 −−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00288.0,00305.0,0237.0,02744.0,00357.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. 
Next we generate the exponentials by the rejection method. We obtain 
 
( ) ( )Ty 77862.1,71674.1,79842.1,77862.1,81784.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( ) ( )Ty 00209.1,1988.1,27609.1,64508.1,69491.26~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( ) ( )Ty 68978.1,75841.1,84159.1,75841.1,83688.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. The theoretical 
solution is 
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( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00295.0,00076.0,02278.0,02431.0,00371.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00514.0,0028.0,03638.0,00312.0,03561.0 −−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 0043.0,00077.0,0245.0,02443.0,00346.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. 
Finally we generate the exponentials by the mixture method. We obtain  
 
( ) ( )Ty 7935.1,80311.1,7836.1,7736.1,73779.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction,  
 
( ) ( )Ty 05501.1,3555.1,4639.1,62196.1,6006.26~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( ) ( )Ty 64508.1,60426.1,83216.1,86937.1,90525.16~ =  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. The theoretical 
solution is 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00421.0,00283.0,02292.0,02626.0,00472.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation driven by dissatisfaction, 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00279.0,00398.0,03829.0,00749.0,0296.0 −−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model I, and 
 
( )( )( ) ( )TiiTi xAxxe 00188.0,00004.0,02372.0,02443.0,00253.0 −−−=⋅−  
 
if we consider the imitation of the successful agent, model II. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
For the problems solved in this paper by the Monte Carlo method we use 
queueing networks as in [7] for solving nonlinear equations and linear systems 
of equations. We use for a nonlinear equation a service system with one sever 
and exponential service ( 1/M/G  service system as it is denoted by Kleinrock 
[15]) as in [6,7], and for linear systems of equations we use Jackson queueing 
networks (see [10]) as in [7,5]. For nonlinear systems of equations (and of 
differential equations) we use a closed network (a Jackson network is an open 
network). The difference between this kind of network and a Gordon and Newell 
network (see [11]) is that in our case the values of iµ  and ijP  are not constant. 
We use also some results from games theory. A relation between queueing 
theory, inventory theory and games theory is presented in [7,4]. 
In the case of the imitation driven by dissatisfaction the service in the 
node i depends on the number of customers in the node, ni (in fact it depends on 
N
n
i
ix = ). This is true as well for the Buzen queueing networks (see [3]). But in 
our model this service depends also on the other xj, and on the payoffs matrix A. 
In the case of the imitation driven by dissatisfaction we have ( ) jji xxp = , hence 
even the probabilities jip  are not constant and depend on nj. In the cases of the 
imitation of successful agent (model II and model II) these probabilities depend 
also on the payoffs matrix A, but the services remain constant 1. 
For solving the above problems we must know the matrix A in the case of 
a nonlinear system of equations and the matrix B in the case of nonlinear system 
of a nonlinear system of differential equations. An open problem is to find the 
matrix if the system of equations is in the form (6’) and if the system of 
differential equations is in the form (10’) (of course, we must find first the 
weakly payoff positive growth-rate function g). Other open problems are to use 
the Monte Carlo method and queueing networks to solve other problems, as the 
linear programming problem and quadratic programming problem. 
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